Introduction
In irregular warfare (IW), special operations forces (SOF) commonly depend on conventional aircraft to conduct close air support (CAS) to compensate for lack of organic firepower. Current CAS doctrine focuses on conventional warfare and fails to provide the proper tools for SOF joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), pilots, and aircrews to perform at the peak of their capability, instead forcing real time improvisation in IW.
Staff Sergeant Ed Shulman's following observation of CAS coordination in the early days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), in late 2001, highlights one of many deficiencies with respect to integrating conventional aircraft in support of Special Operations.
Sergeant Shulman was an enlisted tactical air controller (ETAC) sent to fix CAS coordination issues in the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) at the Combined Air Operations Center
(CAOC) at Prince Sultan AB, Saudi Arabia.
These guys are basically running what I called the "sticky note ASOC," where you've got people running around a building with little yellow sticky notes going, "Hey, Tiger XX needs CAS," "Hey, Cobra XX needs aircraft," "These guys are troops in contact," and it was completely disorganized. It was a mess. You'd see notes stuck up on computer screens, "Cobra whatever needs CAS now!" I'm going, "Hey is that something that needs to be worked? Do you guys not have time to talk?" And they're like, "Oh, that's from yesterday." So you can see . . . how stuff like that can break down really quickly. . . .
We got right up on mIRC Chat--it's like [an] instant messenger-type online chat protocol, but we were using it over SIPRNET. We didn't have any direct radio contact with [TF Dagger in Afghanistan] . . . so I opened a dialogue with them and as soon as I typed in "hey, . . . it's Ed," all of a sudden I got this long, "Hey, oh God, we're so glad you're there, nobody's been there before, this is going to make stuff easier." . . . They were tracking things effectively, but they had no way to communicate what they were doing to the guys at the CAOC. . . . capability to cover all of the operational planning while executing current operations became apparent during the heightened level of CAS requirements for Operation ANACONDA. With the potential for future Afghan Model operations, or similar demands of robust foreign internal defense (FID) operations, it is unacceptable to equip SOF with a "sticky note ASOC."
Thesis
The previous anecdote highlights one of the issues of poor doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) with respect to SOF CAS. This paper focuses on CAS provided to SOF for overt and clandestine missions.
Current Joint DOTMLPF creates tactical and operational limitations that SOF and conventional CAS aircrew must overcome in the heat of battle. Current CAS DOTMLPF focuses on conventional warfare with conventional ground units and fails to provide the proper IW tools, instead forcing improvisation. The Joint and Air Staffs must update doctrine to enhance the organizational structure of Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS). The TAGS organization needs to provide SOF with their own ASOC to assist in the operational planning and control of the relevant portions of TAGS, especially in the absence of the conventional Army's AAGS. Joint Publication 3.09-3 needs to increase available tactics, techniques, and procedures by adding a Fixed-Wing Call for Fire to give SOF an expedient method to target CAS aircraft in critical life threatening situations. For training, the joint community needs to put a concerted effort into SOF and IW pre-combat deployment exercises; merging JTACs, conventional aircraft, and the ASOC to strengthen the CAF/SOF bond. To enable better training, the joint community must procure air and ground facilities to adequately simulate current SOF CAS combat situations. SOF need to enable the education of conventional aircrews by giving them access to secret compartmentalized SOF information. In the personnel category, the creation and employment of a Liaison Officer To Special Operations (LOTSO) will strengthen the relationship and provide a means for detailed integration down range. The Air Force must prioritize putting highly qualified personnel in both the ASOC and LOTSO to provide effective leadership. Enhancements across the spectrum of DOTMLPF, with respect to CAS in support of SOF, is required to provide SOF the ability to employ CAS properly in current and future combat operations.
Research Methods
Due to the recentness of OEF and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) combined with the secret nature of SOF missions, many details about specific applicable missions remain classified. However, some of the declassified accounts provide insight into the challenges faced when integrating conventional airpower with SOF missions. Combining declassified information with the observations and conclusions of subject matter experts and firsthand experience of the author, enables this paper to remain unclassified and still address shortfalls in the DOTMLPF.
The Problem
Since the advent of the aircraft and its involvement in warfare, Army ground forces constitute the largest user of Air Force CAS. 10 Correspondingly, the majority of service and joint DOTMLPF governing CAS focuses on the interaction and support between Air Force assets and Army ground personnel. Until recent conflicts, the CAS DOTMLPF focus appeared to emphasize the most critical relationship as the interaction between conventional air and ground forces. However, the nature of the current "Long War" highlights another critical CAS mission set, SOF support. 11 Although SOF constitute a smaller proportion of overall CAS missions, they often have the greatest CAS requirements. 12 An anecdote from early SOF operations in
Afghanistan illustrates the lack of applicable SOF CAS doctrine, "Task Force Dagger put a sign over their shredder that said, "Put doctrine here."" 13 Operators need relevant doctrine that can serve as a tool in conducting current and future operations.
The majority of SOF CAS missions support Direct Action (DA) missions. SOF DA missions operate with extreme fluidity. The objectives of these SOF missions are typically to neutralize or capture a high value target and greatly depend on intelligence. The time and location are subject to rapid change as the situation and associated intelligence change. The fluidity, tempo, and complexity of SOF missions make them some of the most demanding CAS missions that require real-time detailed integration. Additionally, SOF CAS missions often make the critical difference in survival of the ground forces by attacking enemy forces in close proximity to friendly troops. 14 Due to the complexity inherent in SOF CAS, tactical operators need doctrine to simplify their mission and minimize required on-the-fly innovations. Likewise, as the Army completes its transformation towards a modular force operating in smaller units it will face some of the same lack of firepower and mass challenges that SOF face today. 15 Based on this premise of increased dispersion of force and increased need for air support, conventional
Army CAS can leverage the advantages gained by perfecting doctrine and training for SOF CAS.
Doctrine (Pertaining to Organization)
As discussed earlier, doctrine fails to address the Afghan Model's slightly modified use of kinetic CAS. 16 Execution of the Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq poised a weaker indigenous force against a stronger opposing force. 17 In Afghanistan, SOF teamed up with the under-armed Northern Alliance and airpower to defeat the Taliban who possessed superior numbers and firepower. 18 In Iraq, SOF joined forces with Kurds in Northern Iraq and used airpower to take on the Iraqi Army who outgunned and outmanned the Kurds. 19 In both cases, the SOF advisors overcame the lack of firepower and personnel with airpower in the form of 23 Once fully integrated into OEF, the ASOC became a key enabler. 24 Doctrinally, an Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) and ASOC in conjunction with the CAOC accomplish the operational planning and control of CAS for the conventional Army. 25 An ASOS is assigned to the SOF groups, but no ASOC is specifically assigned to SOF. 26 34 The focus of the JSOAC is on SOF aircraft supporting SOF. Additionally, the JSOAC works through its SOLE at the CAOC to deconflict and integrate SOF aircraft with conventional air operations. 35 The JSOAC is the SOF air expert, but not the conventional air expert. As such, the JSOAC does not operate along the same lines of the TACS and is not equipped to plan or execute robust conventional CAS missions at the operational-level.
While not required for every SOF operation, a SOF ASOC would provide an internal capability to scale air operations according to need and provide the appropriate operational planning and execution capabilities. Colonel Neuenswander responded to criticisms of CAS operational and tactical deficiencies in Operation ANACONDA by stating, "All of these issues While both conventional and SOF roles for CAS are important, the SOF role is typically more time critical to friendly force survival and mission accomplishment. 41 Time critical situations require focused and relevant doctrine to deal with the situation. Specifically, SOF need an effective and efficient way to provide conventional fixed-wing aircraft with targeting information. Additionally, the Army Transformation is changing the way the Army organizes and fights, which will tend to decrease the available organic firepower. 42 and bearing from the target. 44 With the 9-line format, the JTAC must provide the aircraft with specific target coordinates or a visual talk-on to the target. Following a visual talk-on, some rules of engagement (ROE) require pilots to secure target coordinates and read them back to the JTAC. This procedure is well suited for conventional use with numerous friendly force positions, which make it impossible for aircrew to have full SA on precise friendly locations. The procedure also suits current conventional operations, where JTACs control the majority of CAS missions from Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs). 45 The JTACs use video downlinks from CAS fighters and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) to monitor the situation and provide targeting data to the pilots. Conversely, SOF JTACs typically accompany a small DA team and provide control from the battlefield where they might be pinned down by enemy fire. 46 In these instances, the 9-Line Briefing format is cumbersome, slowing CAS down and putting friendly lives at risk. 47 AC-130 aircraft, typically flying in support of SOF ground personnel, use a second format for JTACs to target aircraft, the AC-130 Call for Fire ( Figure 2 ). 48 The AC-130 Call for
Fire uses a friendly centric method instead of the 9-Line's target centric method. In this format, line two, friendly location/mark, provides the anchor point. Line three, target location, references target position in relation to friendly location using bearing and range. 49 During SOF CAS missions, it is imperative to maintain SA on the SOF location. One role of the CAS aircraft is to provide real-time battlespace awareness to the JTAC and his team. This requires monitoring friendlies and conducting search patterns that originate at the SOF and move outward. 50 Thus, typical SOF CAS roles enable an efficient transition to kinetic employment using the friendly centric targeting methodology in the AC-130 Call for Fire. 51 The AC-130 Call for Fire format provides a perfect template to broaden for use with fixed-wing conventional aircraft. Army rotary-wing aviation uses the same friendly centric The major concern with this format is that it must provide the aircraft with precise friendly location, this concern is amplified if friendly coordinates are provided to assist the visual acquisition. 54 With a significant amount of munitions being coordinate seeking, the risk of fratricide increases. The aircrew discipline is required in order to not drop on the friendly coordinates entered into the system, but use a visual means of targeting the enemy. 55 Some aircraft sensor displays can overlay friendly positions on the targeting pod or radar picture. This enables the pilot to ensure he is targeting the correct target and keeping munitions a safe distance away from friendly forces. The AC-130 software provides a safeguard, by putting a weapons inhibit zone around an entered friendly location. 56 If deemed necessary, software engineers could institute the same software precautions on other aircraft.
The Fixed-Wing Call for Fire ( Figure 3 ) would provide an additional tool for the JTAC to use when the conditions warranted. In an unconstrained threat and time situation, the JTAC could still use the 9-Line Briefing format. In addition, it would depend on aircraft capabilities.
To confirm friendly acquisition the aircraft, both fighter and bomber, would need an advanced targeting pod or be able to fly low enough to the ground to visually acquire the friendlies. This method would enable a pinned down JTAC in a time critical situation, to quickly and effectively call for fire support to regain the advantage and win a firefight.
Training / Facilities
Another area lacking appropriate attention is joint training. The SOF community made an effort to fill the training void with the JADED THUNDER training exercise, but it lacks priority and support from the Air Force. 57 The Air Force needs to modify its training focus to match current CAS requirements.
Green The additional emphasis on SOF CAS provides impetus to improve the training facility.
While it is difficult to achieve both the reality of operating in an urban environment and the ability to employ weapons and lasers, it is possible to compartmentalize to achieve the same objectives. The current SOF AO that Green Flag West uses provides the reality of a town, while Green Flag is the proper "flag-type" exercise to incorporate an actual ASOC to enhance training for ASOC personnel, JTACs, and aircrew.
Leadership and Education / Personnel
At the tactical level, SOF CAS missions escort SOF DA teams into enemy territory and provide heavy firepower when required. These SOF lack the organic firepower sometimes required to overcome the adversary. 77 Instead, SOF depend on airpower to provide the firepower and maintain their advantage. 78 When able, a variety of SOF and Other Governmental Agency (OGA) rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft support ground SOF teams. However, the time of day, enemy threat, and location of the mission can decrease the amount of air assets available to support. Conventional fixed-wing aircraft provide the buffer, as well as the overwhelming punch. 79 Additionally, fixed-wing aircraft are the only ones capable of carrying 250 pound and larger munitions required for targeting buildings and bunkers. For these reasons, the SOF CAS stack of aircraft is the most robust and complex of any mission. 80 In such a stack, one to two thousand feet of altitude separate aircraft that densely stack from the surface up to 20,000 feet, or
higher. Comparatively, a conventional CAS stack often maintains a maximum of two to four aircraft. The conventional fixed-wing aircraft typically orbit at the top of the CAS stack, deconflicted from the other players.
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Due to security restrictions, most conventional pilots do not know all of the aircraft types and capabilities in the stack, which limits their overall SA and ability to contribute to the mission. In Afghanistan, different combat units did not know what each other were doing based on the tight compartmentalization. 82 In addition, the rest of the players in the stack enter the stack with higher SA of the mission objective and scope because they have been part of the mission from the beginning or have LNOs in the JSOAC with direct access to the information.
Conversely, conventional aircraft typically play a pickup game with little more than the general location, JTAC callsign, and JTAC frequency. 83 Once arriving on station and frequency the conventional aircrews rarely receive the entire situation brief and may or may not receive specific tasks. 84 Conventional aircrews often glean information from the JTAC frequency, as they listen to the communications between the ground personnel and other aircraft in the stack.
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The aircrews expertly execute their tactical tasks, but could make greater contributions to the overall mission if they fully understood its objectives and tactics.
With increased SA, aircrew could better provide real-time mission surveillance besides being on call for kinetic employment. At the top of the CAS stack, the conventional aircrews maintain a perfect vantage point to enhance the ground force SA. The only problem is a lack of proper mission knowledge as to what is important to the SOF on a particular mission.
Conventional aircrews need access to compartmentalized SOF information to make them more effective team members. The SOF ground commander also needs a means to increase the conventional aircrew's SA prior to them arriving on scene, so they can immediately start contributing to the mission.
For preplanned missions, both the Marine Corps and Army communicate the plan to aircrew prior to their mission brief. The Marine Corps understands the importance of the aircrew knowing the ground force requirements. Like SOF, Marine Corps ground forces travel light with minimal organic firepower. 86 The Marines compensate for lack of ground firepower by integrating rotary-wing and fixed-wing fire support. 87 The Marine Corps codifies the central theme of their tactics in their motto "Rifleman First." 88 Marine officers must complete "The Basic School," a six-month indoctrination program, which teaches every officer to command an infantry platoon. 89 This fundamental foundation in infantry ensures that Marine aviators thoroughly understand the capabilities and limitations of the ground forces they are supporting. 90 Marine aviators often coordinate directly with the ground commander and his staff to comprehend the ground scheme of maneuver prior to mission execution. 91 Full understanding of the ground scheme of maneuver, enables Marine FAC(A)s to take charge on the battlefield and appropriately direct CAS missions. 92 A key result is proactive, instead of reactive, Marine CAS better poised to shape the battlefield to meet the ground commander's objectives. 93 Additionally, Marines use pilots in the ground Forward Air Controller (FAC) role. 94 This means the FAC is intimately familiar with both the limitations and capabilities of both the ground and air forces, which enhances his ability to properly employ CAS.
Although not to the same extent as the Marine Corps, the Army attempts to maximize aircrew SA prior to mission execution. The larger scale of Army and Air Force operations makes it challenging to have the same intimate interaction between CAS aircrew and ground forces.
However, the Army uses Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) at the Wing level to bridge the gap and increase aircrew mission knowledge and SA prior to arriving on station. The GLOs continually talk with the various ground commanders and their fire support officers and clarify the intent for all CAS missions. 95 The GLOs, trained and familiar with air operations, brief aircrews prior to their missions. 96 The pre-mission brief enables aircrew to understand the mission and start contributing to the ground mission upon arrival on station. 97 Similar to the Marine aircrews, the pre-briefing empowers Air Force aircrews to be proactive members of the overall Army scheme of maneuver.
While neither the Marine nor Army methods can directly transfer to SOF, they highlight the mission enhancement gained from air and ground synergy and provide insight on how to create it. It is not feasible for every CAS aircrew to be "SOF First," like the Marine Corps "Rifleman First" concept, due to the time and skills required to develop effective SOF and effective aircrew. At the tactical-level, the Army GLO program provides this critical mission specific SA directly to aircrews for conventional CAS missions. 103 While it would be great to create new a Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) program where a number of SOF personnel reside with the conventional air units and provide them pre-mission briefings, it is impractical. As mentioned previously, the SOF community is considered HD/LD and as such does not have the available personnel to fill a SOLO position. 104 Currently, the SOLE exists to coordinate SOF operations with the CAOC. 105 The conventional air units also have Liaison Officers (LNOs) present at the CAOC. 106 One might argue that the SOLE and LNO can provide the SA link from the JSOAC to the aircrew, but that is too many intermediaries passing second and third hand information. Additionally, the constant changing nature of SOF operations means that information quickly perishes and the SA is in the JSOTF.
The solution is to incorporate a Liaison Officer To Special Operations from each combat wing supporting a JSOTF. According to Joint Publication 3-05.1, the exchange of LNOs is critical to enhance SA. 107 This slightly increases the personnel demand on conventional air units, but the benefits greatly outweigh the cost. With access to the compartmentalized information and as a member of the JSOAC, the LOTSO has direct access to the critical information. The LOTSO is part of the entire process and able to gain SA as a SOF mission develops from intelligence through action. The LOTSO will be abreast of the multiple developing missions. The LOTSO can observe and interpret how the changing mission nuisances will affect his aircrews.
During mission formulation, the LOTSO builds his own aircrew mission brief and keeps it modified to reflect real-time changes to the mission development.
When the execute command comes, the LOTSO briefs the aircrew and transfers all of his situational awareness, in aircrew terminology, to the tasked aircrew. Time permitting the LOTSO can electronically pass mission imagery and accompany it with a telephonic briefing. The rapid nature of some SOF missions means that aircrew may already be in their aircraft on ground alert, or airborne. In these cases, the LOTSO can use radios and Link-16, a tactical data link between aircraft and ground stations, to communicate the critical information. Some aircraft can receive imagery and/or free text messages, while others are currently limited to voice communication.
The LOTSO would fulfill the Joint Publication 3-09 recommendation that "the tactical unit should contact the unit being supported to conduct detailed tactical planning." 108 Currently, the JSOAC floor attempts enroute radio communication, but due to the combination of a non-aircrew personnel on the radio and communication brevity, information is lost in translation. As an aircrew member himself, the LOTSO will understand the most critical information to the aircrew for particular missions and effectively pass it to them. Pertinent information may include mission objective, orbit position, associated restricted operating zones, desired CAS tasks (targeting scheme, desired scan pattern or area, etc.), friendly capabilities on station (including vehicles and equipment), and target or friendly location. Now, the aircrew can arrive on station with high SA and proactively support the SOF.
Multiple examples of the LOTSO concept exist today, just under different names. The AC-130 community realized that they were not gaining the appropriate mission knowledge prior to arriving on station. 109 To rectify the knowledge gap, the AC-130 community started sending a representative to the JSOAC who could funnel information and SA to the AC-130 crew. 110 Similarly, OEF fighter pilots recognized a knowledge deficit and corresponding integration gap that they overcame by putting a pilot on the JSOAC floor. 111 While it is good to see that aviators are overcoming the lack of doctrine concerning a LOTSO with ad hoc liaisons, it is time to codify the LOTSO position in Joint Doctrine to properly leverage its capability to provide aircrew with enroute tactical-level situational awareness.
To take the LOTSO concept one-step further, the 
